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ABSTRACT
Considerable debate has taken place regarding the amount, adequacy, and
effectiveness of funding public schools. At the macro level, research is mixed as
to whether increased funding is associated with improved student performance. In
some specific cases, such as increased funding for lower class size and early
childhood education, spending on specific activities has shown to be effective.
This study examined whether spending categories are associated with
academic performance. Spending allocations and student performance were
examined at the school level for the school years 2004-05 through 2007-08.
Spending data was obtained through the Rhode Island Department of Education
In$ight financial system. Student performance on the New England Common
Assessment Program was used. Two models were employed: Model 1 examined
the aggregate figures for the four years of data regression with a robust estimator
to examine the association of the spending categories and achievement accounting
for poverty. Model 2 used multiple regression with a differencing model in an
attempt to control for unobserved factors such as teacher quality.
The results of the differencing Model 2 were not conclusive. Model 1
showed that spending for direct classroom instruction was a significant predictor
of student achievement. Poverty was also identified as significantly negatively
associated with student performance. All other allocations were either negatively
associated or not associated with student performance.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The improvement of student academic performance has been in the forefront of
national public policy since the publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983. Beginning under
the Reagan presidency and followed by each administration since, the federal role in
public education has expanded considerably, culminating in the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2002. Improving educational outcomes through school reform is widely accepted
by both political leaders and the general public and the level of resources needed to
sustain improvement is a major topic of debate at the national, state and local level.
Insufficient attention, however, has been directed to how financial resources are utilized
and whether the current patterns of allocation are effectively improving student
performance (Wong, 1999).
Per-pupil education expenditures have tripled in the United States during the three
decades from 1960 to 1999 (Odden&Pincus, 2004). However, increased spending has not
been associated with improved student achievement (Hanushek, 2004). These national
trends have been mirrored in Rhode Island: Expenditures for public education in Rhode
Island rose 6% from the years 2000-2006 while many of the highest spending districts are
the lowest performing. Also, in 2008, spending in Rhode Island was $12,478 per pupil,
ranking 7th nationally, while student achievement ranked 26thamong US states (Education
Week, 2009).
Symptomatic of the mismatch between funding and achievement has been Rhode
Island’s historicalfailure to develop a coherent education funding model; Rhode Island
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became the last state in the country to adopt a funding formula for state aid to education.
In the spring of 2010, legislation was enacted to institute a statewide funding formula
which includes: 1) a foundation model in which a basic floor of aid would be established
for each student; 2) a poverty indicator which provides additional funds to meet the needs
of students with low socioeconomic status (SES) and correlates to the supports needed by
children with limited English skills; and3) the capacity to provide local revenue to
provide equitable and adequate resources(Rhode Island Department of Education, 2010).
While Rhode Island’s new funding formula addresses equity in providing more
state aid to communities with limited capacity to raise local revenue, it does not address
resource allocation within districts. Spending decisions are to be left at the local level
without regard to how districts are currently utilizing their funds and whether existing
practice is producing positive results in student achievement. Thus, there is no change to
the allocation of educational expenditures to improve student learningunless the
individual district performs this activity on its own initiative.
In summary, despite the cost and quality problems in American education which
are mirrored in Rhode Island, existing research has not identified clear relationships
between spending and performance and has not articulated the factors underlying
variations in spending patterns across school districts.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to examine to what extent resource allocations in
Rhode Island schools are related to student performance. It was expected that the results
of this study will provide state and local decision-makers with information and strategies
2

for improving the allocation of financial and non-financial resources to support greater
student success.
The study employed two models. The first pooled data over the entire study
period (2004-2008)and tested the association between resource use and student
achievementwhile controlling for student socioeconomic status. The second model was
longitudinal, testing the association between changes in resource use and changes in
student achievement. By testing the association between changes in resource use and
changes in student achievement, the second model would account for unmeasured schoollevel factors that remain constant across adjacent years.
Research Question 1: What is the relationship between spending on public
education in Rhode Island and student achievement?
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between annual changes in
spending on public education in Rhode Island and annual changes in student
achievement?
Hypothesis 1:
Higher per-pupil spending on direct instruction at the school level is associated with
higher student reading, math, and writing performance.
Hypothesis 2:
Higher per-pupil spending on instructional support, operations, leadership and other
commitments at the school levelare not associated with higher student reading, math, and
writing performance.
3

Hypothesis3:
School-level changes in per-pupil spending on direct instruction are associated with
changes in student reading, math, and writing performance.
Hypothesis 4:
School-level changes in per-pupil spending on instructional support, operations,
leadership and other commitments are not associated with changes in student reading,
math, and writing performance.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical Framework: Educational Production Function and Agency Theory
In a pluralistic, multi-ethnic society like the United States, the purpose of public
education is a matter of considerable debate. As political and economic issues gain
prominence, pressure to “reform” education often follows. The tension regarding the
purpose of public education reflects the competing emphases on the principles of liberty,
equality and efficiency (Guthrie, 2003). Public policy emerges to address an identified or
perceived need, and the targets of the policy, as well as those who share the burdens of its
impact and cost is of particular concern (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).
For many years, education was assessed on an “inputs” basis. Schools were rated
by criteria such as volumes in the library, number of electives offered and the condition
of the physical plants. In Rhode Island, the Basic Education Program (BEP) was an effort
to establish minimum input standards for each district, the assumption being that by
providing a minimum level of program, students would have the opportunity to meet their
academic expectations (Galston, 2005; Rhode Island Department of Education, 1989).
Following the publication of A Nation at Risk, concern over the academic
performance of American schools became a prominent national issue as attention shifted
to the outputs of the system. In this context, an argument was made that school reform
must be viewed from an economic perspective. Hanushek (1994) maintained that little
systemic relationship has been found between resources and student performance. He
recommended that schools evaluate educational programs on a cost-benefit basis,
5

improve performance by providing incentives to teachers (merit pay) and parents (school
choice, privatization of educational services), and allow for continuous adaptation and restructuring of existing institutions (Hanushek, 1994).
Production Theory
Mainstream economic theory assumes that firms seek to find the most efficient
use of inputs to maximize profits. Production theory asks what combination of inputs, as
factors of production, will generate the quantity of output that yields maximum profit. A
process is inefficient if a different combination of inputs could produce a greater quantity
of goods or services. Economists use a mathematical equation model known as a
production function to study production empirically. The production function model’s
output is a function of various levels of inputs (Mankiw, 2003).
Production theory holds that resources allocated toward activities that are more
proximally related to student outcomes will result in better student performance. This
implies that resources dedicated to direct instruction will improve student outcomes more
than resources dedicated to activities without a strong relationship with student outcomes.
The production function in education examines the output of a school system,
measured in standardized test scores, graduation rates, and years of schooling, for
example, against the input variables, such as expenditures on classroom instruction,
operations, libraries, extracurricular programs, or other activities (Monk, 1990;
Hanushek, 1979). Education production models attempt to predict the factors that
maximize output. As a result of the application of economic principles to education
policy, Hanushek asserts that “Reform will come more assuredly from an improved
6

decision process that focuses attention on student performance than from further attempts
to overwhelm the problems of schools with resources” (Hanushek, 1994, p 151).
The production function is useful tool for economic analysis but has limits that
must be taken into consideration. The narrow use of test scores as the sole output of an
educational system overlooks the diverse functions and responsibility of schools. For
example, the federal government has directed most of its educational spending to counter
the inequity that arises from class, language, race, and disability. Funding for education is
critical to produce the societal goal of liberty and equality by providing educational
opportunity, regardless of socioeconomic status (Wong, 1999). In addition, a strictly
economic analysis of the production function ignores the complicated political forces that
operate in school systems.
The production function also assumes that educational organizations work in
concert to achieve like goals in student achievement (Odden&Picus, 2004). However,
contemporary implementation study recognizes the complexity of putting a policy into
practice. The goals, targets and tools of a particular policy interact with the people who
are affected and the culture of the local setting where the policy is enacted. Cross-system
and organizational relationships affect the production function in terms of policy
implementation. School systems are constrained by sources and amounts of revenue, the
misalignment of mission due to the agency problem, employee contracts, state and
federal regulations, and other aspects of production. Unlike private firms, educational
institutions do not control their student and family inputs. Political realities must be
considered along with an economic approach to the education production function
thatcan identify how resources are allocated and their relationship to student achievement
7

(Loeb & McEwan, 2006). The relationship between spending and outcomes can be
examined through agency theory (Honing, 2006).
A production formula applied in a manufacturing context may produce more
definitive results then when used in an educational setting, given the fact that public
educational institutions have multiple goals beyond achievement tests as outputs, and
have far more variables associated with the inputs, most notably the students.
Nonetheless, economic production theory has a place in the financial analysis of school
districts to examine if resources are allocated effectively.
Agency Theory
There are two key barriers to using an education production model to improve
educational outcomes. First, the relationship between education inputs and outputs
remains poorly understood. Second, assuming perfect knowledge of the production
function and the interest of a district to put the production function into place, the optimal
allocation of resources may not be employed. This is a result of both the political realities
of school systems and the self-interested behavior of actors in the system.
The principal-agent problem arises when a principal compensates an agent for
performing certain acts that are useful to the principal and costly to the agent, and where
there are elements of the performance that are costly to observe.The misalignment of
interests among administrators and management (the district) and agents (teachers) is an
example of an agency problem (Pratt &Zeckhauser, 1985; Ross, 1973).Agency theory is
the study of the behavior of principals and agents in the presence of agency problems. In
the context of this study, teachers and administrators likely have numerous interests that
differ from those of the district, including personal benefits such as pay, job security and
8

working conditions. Given the strength of unions in public education, many of these
preferences are institutionalized, at the expense of efficient allocation of resources.
However, as shown by differences in teacher contracts, union strength varies
substantially across districts, resulting in variations in the extent to which union
preferences are institutionalized.
In a business illustration, the principal could be the factory owner, and two types
of agents are the sales staff and production workers. The owner (principal) wishes to
maximize profits, and may do so in more than one way: s/he may attempt to align the
agents with his goals by profit sharing, increasing production incentives, sales bonuses,
or incentives for meeting production targets; another owner may attempt to maximize
profits by keeping expenses low. S/he may not share information with the workers and
thus increase the risk of creating an agency problem. The workers may feel far removed
from the goals of the company and may form a union to protect their working conditions
and job security.
When applied to public schools, agency theory becomes far more complex. The
workers in a school system such as central administrators, building principals, teachers,
classroom aides, clerks, and custodians, filter policy and district goals through the lens of
their own experience. These groups generally promote and protect their vested interests
in terms of their wages, working conditions and institutional power structure. Goals and
policies that are viewed as inconsistent with their interests are likely to face opposition
(Malen, 2006).

Production Function and Agency Theory in Rhode Island Public Education
9

The multiple layers of principal-agent relationshipsinfluence the allocation of
resources for public education in Rhode Island. In terms of state aid for education, the
State, through the Department of Education (RIDE), is the principal and the districts are
agents in terms of providing state assessment data, meeting grade level and grade span
curriculum expectations, and meeting graduation requirements and other responsibilities
under state laws and regulations. The districts, through their local school committees, are
principals whose respective agents are administrators, teachers and non-instructional
staff, whose primary interest may not be directly related to student achievement. Schools
provide a service that cannot be measured by their profit or loss. Instead, output in the
form of assessment results, graduation rates, community support, and school climate is
multidimensional and difficult to measure. What a school produces in terms of increased
test scores or graduation rates is the result of the contributions of numerous individuals
over time (Loeb & McEwan, 2006).
In addition to principal/agent relationships, communities are influenced by
political, fiscal and demographic realities in the allocation of resources. For example,
districts with relatively small school population and high property value per pupil have
ample resources and can meet local need by providing jobs with security and benefits to
local residents (Galston, 2005). In urban districts, which receive a higher proportion of
state aid relative to the local contribution in order to serve a higher percentage of lowincome students, teacher contracts often provide generous benefits to agents/teachers
whose primary goal may be higher wages and post- retirement benefits (Grubb et al,
2006).
10

Lack of community resources and small amounts of state aid may limit per-pupil
spending. The local political decision to dedicate more local resources to municipal
services may impact educational spending as well. This situation requires a school district
to prioritize spending to direct instruction (basic facilities, curriculum offerings and
teachers) as the school budget hovers at a break-even threshold. Once the threshold is
met, however, districts tend to spend on more peripheral purposes to meet community
needs: employing more local residents (maintenance workers, classroom aides, crossing
guards), providing more student support (guidance, remedial and gifted teachers), adding
enrichment programs (after school activities, sports, field trips), and enhancing facilities
(building renovations, vehicle purchases, technology upgrades). The spending beyond the
threshold may meet community needs and provide desired programs, but may not be
directly related to academic achievement (Picus&Fazal, 1995).
“The politics of resource allocation over the last thirty years can be characterized
as a process of layering, adding more social responsibilities and bureaucratic guidelines
to the school’s core instructional functions” (Wong, 1999, p15). With the passage of
time, layers of decisions become institutionalized and rarely change. This is true at all
levels of government. At the federal level, rules on compensatory funding restrict the
local district’s ability to utilize funds creatively; state laws passed years before continue
to dictate school decisions in a different environment, and locally negotiated teacher
contracts restrict schools’ ability to assign staff where they can best meet student needs
(Wong, 1999).
How districts allocate resources may be examined by comparing the per-pupil
expenditures allocated to direct instruction to other expenditures. A systematic
11

examination of allocation processes can provide the knowledge base for school reformers
to redesign decision rules to improve student performance (Wong, 1999).
Factors Affecting Achievement
The educational production function must take into account the variations that
occur between the inputs to the system. The different backgrounds and abilities that the
children bring to school determine whether teachers can begin their instruction at a
remedial or accelerated pace. The socio-economic status of children has been shown to be
strongly related to predicting student achievement, as has class size, teacher quality, and
other factors.
Student Socio-Economic Status
Beginning with the Coleman Report (1966), socio-economic status (SES) at the
student level has been found to be one of the strongest correlates of academic
performance. The correlates at the school level are even stronger. Family SES sets the
stage for students’ academic performance both by directly providing resources at home
and by indirectly providing the social capital that is needed for school success (Coleman,
1988). As a result of current educational and social policies, students who are at risk
because of family SES are more likely to end up in schools with limited financial
resources (Reynolds & Walberg, 1992,Sirin, 2005). Low SES schools have important
differences from their affluent counterparts in terms of quality of instruction, materials,
teacher experience, and class size (Wenglinsky, 1998). In addition to the quality of
instruction, family SES is related to the quality of relationships between school personnel
and parents (Watkins, 1997). Thus, SES not only reflects the effect of resources at home,
12

but is also associated with social capital and its effect on academic achievement (Sirin,
2005).
Student poverty is negatively correlated with student outcomes, and usually
significantly so.Student poverty is also significantly and negatively correlatedwith the
qualifications of teachers; that is, the less socially advantaged thestudents, the less likely
teachers are to hold full certification and a degree intheir field and the more likely they
are to have entered teaching withoutcertification (Darling-Hammons, 1999).
Despite these limitations, there have been interventions that have improved the
educational achievement of those who might otherwise fail in school because of their
family background. For example, small school and class size (Finn & Achilles, 1990;
Glass & Smith, 1989; Grissmer et al., 1998; Krueger, 1998), early childhood education,
federal programs such as Title 1 and Head Start, after-school programs and summer
school sessions (Entwisle& Alexander, 1994), and qualified school personnel (Wang,
1998), have all been found to be important factors in reducing the achievement gap
between children of the "haves" and the "have-nots." Future educational and social
programs have the potential to provide more support for these and other innovative
programs that can lift the educational achievement of those who are at risk for school
failure due to family SES. Without such support, the current system is likely to produce
an intergenerational cycle of school failure because of family SES (Sirin, 2005).
Data on free and reduced-price lunches are consistently used as a proxy for SES
because of their link to the government’s poverty guidelines, are available for every
student, they are nonintrusive, theyare simple (eligible, not eligible), and they can be
obtained relatively cheaply because information are taken directly from school records.
13

These characteristics help to explain the continued popularity of this variable as a
measure of SES (Harwell &LeBeau, 2010). Harwell &LeBeau caution that use of free
and reduced lunch data has its limitations: eligibility is a poor measure of a student’s
access to economic resources; participation rates decline with increases in grade level;
status is theoretically available for every student, however, failure to respond to the
program results in a classification of non-free and reduced, and a resulting inappropriate
evaluation of SES.
Multiple linear regression procedures produced strong evidence that the
socioeconomic status of the district was the predominant predictor of student
performance on the 2003 Washington Assessment of Student Learning Reading and
Mathematics subtests for 4th and 7th graders. Positive correlations that emerged between
actual levy percentages and student achievement provided evidence that through
equitable, adequate, and appropriate public school fiscal practices, Washington school
districts that are small and rural have the potential to overcome a portion of the strong
and negative association between poverty and student outcomes (Diaz, V., 2008)
Although at nine months of age there are no detectable cognitive differences
between black and white babies, differences emerge as early as age two, and by the time
black childrenenter kindergarten they are lagging behind whites by 0.64 standard
deviations in math and 0.40 in reading (Fryer & Levitt, 2004). On every subject at every
grade level, there are large achievement differences between black children and white
children that continue to grow as they progress through school. Even accounting for a
host of background factors, the achievement gap remains large and statistically
significant (Fryer, 2010, Neal, 2006).
14

Fryer and Levitt (2006) take a pessimistic view of educational interventions to
address the gaps in student SES. They state that the attempts to close the achievement gap
such as early childhood interventions Head Start, Nurse-Family Partnership, and the
Abecedarian Project, boost kindergarten readiness, but the effects on achievement often
fade once children enter school (Krueger & Whitmore, 2001; Anderson, 2008). More
aggressive strategies that place disadvantaged students in better schools through busing
(Angrist& Lang, 2004) and school choice plans (Rouse, 1998; Krueger & Zhu, 2002;
Cullen et al., 2005; Hastings et al., 2006), have also left the racial achievement gap
essentially unchanged.
The lack of progress has fed into a long-standing debate among scholars,
policy-makers, and practitioners as to whether schools alone can close the achievement
gap or whether the issues children bring to school are too much for even the best
educators to overcome. Proponents of the school-centered approach refer to anecdotes of
excellence in particular schools or examples of other countries where poor children in
superior schools outperform average Americans (Chenoweth, 2007). Advocates of the
community-focused approach argue that teachers and school administrators are dealing
with issues that originate outside the classroom, citing research that shows racial and
socioeconomic achievement gaps are formed before children ever enter school (Fryer &
Levitt, 2004; 2006), and that one-third to one-half of the gap can be explained by familyenvironment indicators (Phillips et al., 1998; Fryer & Levitt, 2004). In this scenario,
combating poverty and having more constructive out-of-school time may lead to better
and more-focused instruction in school. Coleman et al. (1966), in their report on equality
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of educational opportunity, argue that schools alone cannot treat the problem of chronic
underachievement in urban schools.

Class Size Reduction
Under specific conditions, class size reduction has been associated with improved
student performance. In the randomized Tennessee Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio
(STAR) experiment, the state of Tennessee tested the effect of smaller class size on
student achievement. This study ran for four years and was implemented for a cohort of
kindergartens beginning in 1985. The study continued until the students completed third
grade, and included over 11,600 students. Results from the experiment showed a strong
and lasting effect of smaller class sizes. The presence of classroom aides was not
significant. Students in smaller classes outperformed their counterparts in large classes,
and the more years they stayed in reduced sized classes, the longer-lasting were the
benefits. In addition, the effect sizes were significantly greater for minority students in
the smaller classes, based on reading and mathematics performance (Finn & Achilles,
1990; Grissmer et al., 1998; Krueger, 1998).
Findings in Wisconsin’s Student Achievement Guarantee in Education (SAGE)
are consistent with the STAR experiment.The Student Achievement Guarantee in
Education (SAGE) was designed to improve the academic achievement of children living
in poverty by: 1) reducing class size to fifteen students in grades one and two; 2) staffing
before and after school programs; and 3) conducting extensive staff development. A
quasi-experiment was conducted by examining the performance of students in the SAGE
schools with a comparable population in a non-SAGE control group. The results
16

demonstrated that participation in all the components of the SAGE program was a
significant predictor of success in later grades (Molnar, Smith, Zahorik, Palmer,
Halbach&Ehrle, 2000).
Massive class size reduction programs must calculate the ability of facilities to
provide sufficient classroom space and the availability of qualified teachers necessary to
meet the increased demand. When California undertook a similar, state-wide initiative to
reduce class sizes, there were immediate problems of teacher shortages, insufficient
classroom space, and higher costs. The California class-size reduction program (CSR)
used an infusion of state funds to reduce class sizes in grades K-3 from twenty-eight to
twenty students. Similar to the STAR program, the California CSR found smaller but
statistically significant differences in reading, math and language between students in
smaller classes and students in larger classes. Because of the resulting facilities issues and
shortage of teachers that affected less affluent districts, Bohrnstedt and Stecher (1999)
observed that rather than improve greater opportunity for learning, the California
initiative increased the inequities between schools that served the wealthy and those that
served lower-income students.
It is important to note that pupil-teacher ratios and class size are not necessarily
the same.Data on pupil-teacher ratios reflect the total number of teachers and students at
a given time, but not their utilization. For example, a district may have only two teachers,
one who spends all day in class with the students and the other who is department head,
and spends all day evaluating the lesson plans of the classroom teacher. In this case, the
pupil-teacher ratio is half that of the class size experienced by the students. If teachers are
required to meet fewer classes during the day than the number of classes that each student
17

takes, the pupil-teacher ratio will be less than the average class size. Some teachers are
also assigned to various duties outside the regular classroom, such as lunch, study hall or
corridor supervision. Thus typical class sizes observed in schools tend to be larger than
measured pupil-teacher ratios. Class size is defined in teacher contracts in terms of
fairness as opposed to student achievement (Hanushek, 1999).
In conclusion, class size reduction, under specific circumstances, is a predictor of
student achievement.
Teacher Quality
The salaries and benefits for teachers account for the largest portion of a school
budget and thus are the main component of the production function. It is implicit that
teacher quality and effective practice would be associated with student achievement.
There is evidence that the strategies employed by teachers as well as their
education source and levels have an influence on student performance (Haycock, 1998;
Rivkin, et. al, 2005), Students learn more from teachers who have graduated from higherrated institutions, and in the case of mathematics, students learn more from teachers with
certification in mathematics and degrees in and courses related to mathematics (Wayne
&Youngs, 2003). Studies linking teacher scores on tests of academic ability to student
achievement have led some to believe that general academic ability and verbal skills are
measureable predictors of teacher quality (Ferguson & Ladd, 1996; Hanushek, 1996).
When studies have examined teacher knowledge of both subject matter and how to teach,
they found that knowledge of methodology also had a strong relationship to student
achievement (Darling-Hammond & Sykes, 2003; Rivkin, Hanushek&Kain, 2005;
18

Wenglinsky, 2002).Characteristics such as education level (percentage of teachers with
master’sdegrees), show a positive but less strong relationships with education outcomes
(Darling-Hammond, 1999).
Research on the impact of teacher quality on student achievement revealed that
students' exposure to successive years of poorly qualified teachers during the formative
educational stages, impacts long-term achievement. Yet, the research also shows that
students from low-income and minority communities are often served by the least
qualified teachers (Ferguson, 1998; Sanders & Rivers, and the Education Trust, 1998).
Partial correlations confirm a strong, significant relationship of teacher quality
variables to student achievement, even after controlling for student poverty and for
student language background. Darling-Hammond (1999) identified teacher certification
as a predictor of student achievement. She found the strongest, consistently negative
predictors of student achievement, also significant in almost all cases, were the
proportions of new teachers who are uncertified (Darling-Hammond, 1999, DarlingHammond, L., & Sykes, G.2003). Teacher characteristics of verbal ability, exam scores
and experience studied in production function research, bear a stronger and more
consistent relationship with pupil performance on achievement tests, than do other
characteristics in terms of teacher ability (Jefferson, 2005).
Leadership studies have had the same mixed results as thosewhichexamined
teacher quality. Waters, Marzano and McNulty (2003) identified twenty-one leadership
responsibilities associated with improved student performance in their meta-analysis.
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They acknowledge, however, that poor leadership is associated with negative student
performance.
Other Influences on Achievement
Research has shown that numerous factors influence student achievement, many
of which are not related to financial intervention and are outside the production function.
A number of researchers have identified parental expectations as significant to
student performance in school and are critical to student academic achievement. High
expectations from parents are generally associated with higher levels of educational
attainment. Effective parenting practices associated with high levels of academic
achievement include expectations that children earn high numerical grades on
schoolwork. In addition, the research suggests that child rearing beliefs, provisions for
academically enriching home environments, and standards of acceptable behavior in and
out of school are equally important to academic achievement (Jencks and Phillips, 1998;
Okagaki&Frensch, 1998, Wong, 1990).
Parental education and social economic status have an impact on student
achievement, although the exact nature is not clear. Phillips (1998) found that parental
education and family socioeconomic status alone are not the only predictors of student
academic achievement. Ferguson (1991) posited that in addition to SES, parental
education accounted for variance in students test scores. Other researchers contend that
dysfunctional home environments, low parental expectations, ineffective parenting,
language differences and high levels of mobility might account for lower levels of
academic achievement among students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds
(Frymier&Gansneder, 1989; Laosa, 1978).
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The literature has identified the lack of quality preschool education for minority
children as a factor contributing to the achievement gaps between ethnic minority and
non-minority students. Based on evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (1998), many minority children start school with academic preparation that lags
behind their white counterparts.
School resources are complex, and they compound. Abstract resources related to
innovative teaching, staff development, planning time, teacher control and efficacy, and
certain student support services are not always associated with financial commitments.
These unique, personal factors can be as powerful and consistent in their effects as class
size, teacher experience, or salaries, the resources than have dominated prior research.
Furthermore, the factors leading to higher levels of complex and compound resources are
variables such as school autonomy, collegial decision-making, and distributed leadership,
whereas expenditure and revenue patterns are effective only in explaining simple
resources (Grubb, 2009).
The Relationship between Spending and Student Achievement
Darling-Hammond (1999) used data from a 50-state survey of policies, state case
study analyses, the 1993-94 Schools and Staffing Surveys (SASS), and the National
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), to study the ways in which teacher
qualifications and school inputs are related to student achievement across states.
She found that at the aggregate state level, it was difficult to establish a direct
relationship between spending and achievement. Per-pupil spending showed a significant
positive relationship with student outcomes in 4th grade reading in 1993-94, but no
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relationship with student outcomes in mathematics. This might be the case, the author
theorized, because the spending measureincorporated resources spent not only on teacher
salaries and professionaldevelopment but also on class sizes and other resources that may
especiallysupport students in the early grades as they are learning to read.
Althoughsalaries and spending are strongly related to one another, teacher salarylevels,
unadjusted for cost of living differences, are not correlated with student outcomes when
aggregated to the state level. Other school resources, such as pupil-teacher ratios, class
size ratios, and the proportion of teachers in the school staff showed weak and rarely
significant relationshipsto student achievement when they were aggregated to the state
level (Darling-Hammond, 1999).
Studies of spending at the district level, however, have revealed patterns of
effectiveness. Pan, Rudo, Schneider & Smith-Hansen, (2003) compared district spending
and achievement levels in Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas and New Mexico. They found
high-performing districts spent more on instruction as a share of current expenditures
than low-performing districts, while in three states high-performing districts spent more
on instruction per-pupil and employed more teachers per 1,000 students. The differences
in resource allocation between the low-performing and high-performing groups were
reduced in two of the four states when the comparisons controlled for demographic
factors and socioeconomic status. A majority of the twelve districts identified as
improving (but not high achieving) spent more per-pupil in instruction and instructionrelated areas, and also increased allocations for these areas faster than comparison
districts over the five-year period examined. At the same time, the twelve improving
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districts were found to re-allocate resources away from administrative and other noninstructional areas (Pan, Rudo, Schneider & Smith-Hansen, 2003).
Districts with higher student academic performance spend more per-pupil on
instruction and regular education programs. Expenditures on instruction account for
almost sixty percent of operating expenditures. Program expenditures for regular
education account for nearlytwo-thirds of program expenditures (Alexander, et. al, 2000).
High-performing districts demonstrate different resource allocation patterns in
specific fiscal and staffing categories than low-performing districts. If the goal is to
improve student performance, the key variables appear to be more intensive use of staff
and greater professional development activities. Performance is associated with higher
spending for instruction, tests and teaching materials and number of teachers, as well as
lower spending for central office administrationand number of administrative staff. In
addition, variations in capital outlays (spending on facility construction and
maintenance), school-level administration (principal's office), and teacher education
levels, were not associated with variations in achievement (Odden&Picus, 2004;
Wenglinski, 2002).
Similarly, expenditures for functions outside of instruction, including school
administration, instructional media, guidance, health services, extracurricular activities,
and staff development, fail to show a significant relationship with math and reading
performance once all of the student and school control variables are considered. The
relationship between school expenditures and student achievement depends on how
money is spent (Harter, 1999).
The Effect of Teacher Unions on Funding
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In addition, the unionization of both teachers and non-certified staff in the public
schools can have an impact on student achievement by the potential diversion of
resources from activities that directly benefit students. Through the creation of rigid
contracts patterned on the industrial model, school administrators are denied the
flexibility to assign teachers and staff to where they will be most effective (Moe, 2009).
Such difficulties lie at the root of the two fundamental problems that undercut
accountability in schools. The agency problem arises because school employees (the
agents) have their own interests distinct from those of the authorities (the principals,
central office administrators, and school boards). The agents have institutional power
giving the former the incentive and the capacity to resist top-down efforts to hold them
accountable. The political problem arises because the authorities are elected officials who
are responsive to the political power of school employees and thus have incentive to
ignore true accountability. If school accountability is to succeed, reformers need to break
from top-down methods of control and recognize that a combination of top-down and
bottom-up approaches is more likely to yield results (Moe, 2003).
Funds raised at the local level are especially impacted by union agreement. Most
of the dollars subject to local control are allocated via teacher hiring, salary increases, and
work assignment decisions, which are structured by collective bargaining agreements.
School boards often enter into these agreements with poor understanding of how funds
are currently used and what a teacher labor contract will cost. In many recent cases, local
school boards have approved contracts that would create significant budget deficits only
two or three years later. Boards also frequently commit to pay teacher healthcare and
pension contributions that cost little in the year they are made but have major “balloon
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payments” later (Loeb and Miller 2007; Podgursky&Ehlert, 2007). As a result, many
districts have limited flexibility in the ways they use locally raised funds. Districts also
have a great deal of difficulty knowing precisely how education resources are spent (Hill,
Roza& Harvey, 2008).
One contractual area where educational funds are diverted from classroom
instructionis in post-retirement benefits. Upon retirement, some contracts provide health
care benefits to retirees and their spouses. These contract provisions are indicative of
strong union bargaining that gives direct benefits to union members no longer providing
service and consumes considerable resources that might be used in the classroom for the
benefit of students (Education Partnership, 2006).
Conversely, when strong management responsibilities are emphasized in
collective bargaining agreements, the potential rises to align district goals between
principals and agents. In 2004, the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) and Chicago Teachers
Union signed a new collective bargaining agreement that gave principals the flexibility to
dismiss probationary teachers (defined as those with less than five years of experience)
for any reason, and without the elaborate documentation and hearing process typical in
many large, urban school districts. Results suggest that the policy reduced annual teacher
absences by roughly 10% and reduced the prevalence of teachers with 15 or more annual
absences by 20%. The effects were strongest among teachers in elementary schools and
in low-achieving, predominantly African-American high schools, and among teachers
with high predicted absences. There is also evidence that the impact of the policy
increased substantially after its first year (Jacob, 2010).
The Allocation of Resources in Schools
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Research has produced a great deal of information about how dollars are
distributed to school districts. However, there is insufficient data in the research on how
to put dollars to productive use. From recent studies, it is known that most school district
budgets are spent at and within school sites for a wide range of student services such as
instruction, school leadership, counseling services, supplies, and materials. The
remaining expenditures support the district administration, transportation, utilities, tax
collection, insurance coverage, and other business and operating expenses (Odden&
Archibald, 2001; Picus&Fazal, 1995). Nationally, spending for instruction represents 60
% of state and local operating expenditures (Odden& Busch,1998; Picus, 2001;
Picus&Fazal, 1995).
Researchers have found that school districts are consistent in the way they
allocate resources (Miles & Darling-Hammond, 1998). When funding levels rise due to
state aid or property tax increases, districts use operating funds primarily for smaller class
sizes and teacher pay increases. When more federal, grant or restricted funds are
available, districts enhance instructional programs with new technology, teacher aides,
and professional development linked to the program. (Picus&Fazal, 1995).
Most states were closely clustered around the national average (61.7%) in terms
of the allocation toward direct instruction share of expenditures for the year 1999-2000.
Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma and the District of Columbia
spent less than 58.0 percent of their current expenditures on instruction while three states,
New York (68.1%), Maine (66.9%), and Massachusetts (66.8%), spent more than twothirds of their expenditures on instruction (Johnson, 2003).
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Grubb (2009) maintains that public schools are structured to poorly allocate
resources. First, public education is driven by conventional interest group politics. The
demand for jobs often is more powerful than that for enhanced learning, and so battles
over the level and distribution of spending dominate educational politics. Second, several
characteristics of schools as organizations: loose coupling, organizational inertia,
instability, disagreement about goals, and the sheer effort of instruction, make it difficult
to ensure changes in schools and teachers. In the existing fiscal climate, the lack of
flexible resources may inhibit reform because teachers and administrators do not have the
time to change their practices. Reforms that entail jointly necessary changes rather than
piecemeal reform are particularly difficult under the conditions in many schools,
including disagreements over goals and pedagogies, instability in personnel, and
inconsistencies in perceptions of roles. Third, resources are inflexibly committed to
salaries and benefits covered by contracts that cannot be changed in the short run. Even
long-run changes may entail political battles, especially with unions. Other resources are
embedded in school buildings and land, which are difficult and expensive to reconfigure.
As incremental budgeting prevails, marginal changes occur from year to year. Many
reforms end up being "more of the same," and if the old uses of resources were not
particularly effective, the new ones will not be either(Grubb et al, 2006).
Schools often spend much less money per-pupil on core courses such as English
and mathematics than on elective courses. Although results vary somewhat among the
districts, class sizes (large classes for core courses, smaller classes for special electives),
teacher salaries (senior teachers claim the elective courses for themselves), and different
workloads (senior teachers often teach fewer courses), work together to skew spending.
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Hence, students in elective courses get the benefit of more spending than students in core
courses that determine high school graduation (on which state accountability plans focus)
(Roza, 2008). District and school accounting can hide these spending patterns, and
district leaders and principals are often unaware of how much they are spending or what
other uses might be made of the same funds (Hill, Roza& Harvey, 2008).
Principals and teachers would often make different choices about use of the same
money if they could. Schools in which principals have different degrees of control over
spending (Roza, Davis, and Guin 2007), such as those in private, charter, and districtdecentralized schools, hire larger numbers of teachers but pay lower salaries on average
than district-run schools, where principals have no choices about whom to hire. Principals
who have greater control over funds also focus their spending on generalist classroom
teachers and part-time teachers and, relative to district-run schools, employ fewer
administrators, classroom aides, and full-time specialist teachers (Hill, Roza& Harvey,
2008).
Districts also have a great deal of difficulty knowing where their money is spent
or what things cost. This is true in part because districts maintain different accounting
systems for items that are necessarily mingled together to run a school or deliver any
instructional service. Thus, costs of salaries, benefits, facilities, technology, and private
contracts for services are sometimes maintained in separate data systems, making it
difficult to know the combined costs of any given resource or activity. The practice of
keeping accounts district-wide means that it is almost impossible for district leaders to
know exactly how much is spent on a particular school in the salary, benefits, or
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technology accounts and therefore what is spent overall on any school (Hill, Roza&
Harvey, 2008).
Both the lack of community resources and low levels of state aid may limit perpupil spending. The local political decision to dedicate more local resources to municipal
services may impact educational spending as well. These lower spending districts are
closer to a spending threshold that tends to maximize educational spending for direct
instruction, since there are insufficient resources to spend beyond the classroom. Once
the threshold is met, however, districts tend to spend on more peripheral purposes to meet
community needs: employing more local residents (maintenance workers, classroom
aides, crossing guards), providing more student support (guidance, remedial and gifted
teachers) and adding enrichment programs (after-school activities, sports, field trips) and
enhancing facilities (building renovations, vehicle purchases, technology upgrades)
(Guthrie, et al, 2007).The spending beyond the threshold may meet community needs and
provide desired programs, but may not be related to academic achievement.
There is evidence that low-income, heavily state-subsidized school districts spend
less efficiently than affluent school districts. As a general rule, the level of program
operation or expansion matches the level of funds available. This matching occurs
regardless of the theoretical “cost” of the program, that is, the minimum expenditure
required to operate the program at a successful level. Related research on the local use of
new money from school finance reforms has found similar patterns of resource use. Poor
districts get more money and use it for clear needs (facilities, social services,
compensatory education), but little of the new money makes it into the regular education
program. The result is a system in which money rises, services expand outside the regular
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classroom, but results in terms of student achievement stay flat or improve by only small
amounts (Jefferson, 2005).
By state law (R.I.G.L. 16-7-23), Rhode Island communities must fund local
schools at the same level as the previous year. State aid must be used to support local
education functions, and should a district end a fiscal year with a surplus, those funds are
carried over to the next year as a fund balance. For this reason, schools have little
incentive to spend less or in a more efficient manner since they are encouraged to spend
at least as much as the previous year, except in cases of significant enrollment decline
when the budget can be reduced at a proportional level to the lower number of students.
Summary
Research supports a number of strategies that are associated with improved
student performance. Under certain circumstances, reduced class size (Finn & Achilles,
1990; Grissmer et al., 1998; Krueger, 1998) and improving the quality of the teaching
staff (Darling-Hammond & Sykes, 2003; Goe& Stickler, 2008; Rivkin, Hanushek&Kain,
2005) are associated with improved student performance. These actions require the
allocation of financial resources because hiring additional teachers to decrease class size
and increasing pay to attract quality teachers cost considerable sums. The research does
not point to a simplistic application into an education production function
(Normore&Ilon, 2006), but does point to focusing resources directly on the classroom.
Increasing expenditures from local sources or from state and federal revenues are
not reliable methods of enhancing educational outcomes. Fiscal resources may be
necessary but insufficient for some of these changes, and most important influences must
be created by schools working as communities of practice, preferably with the support
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and guidance of districts, to create the most effective resources (Grubb, 2006).Districts
that allocate larger proportions of spending to direct classroom instruction have
demonstrated a correlation with higher student achievement (Alexander, et. al, 200;
Odden&Picus, 2003; Pan, Rudo, Schneider & Smith-Hansen, 2003; Wenglinski, 2002).
This prioritization may be indicative of a lower incidence of agency problems (Honing,
2006; Loeb & McEwan, 2006).
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The study examined spending and related achievement in Rhode Island public
schools. At the macro level, total per-pupil spending was examined to determine if an
association exists among student achievement in reading, mathematics and writing.
Spending by district was divided into various allocation categories and compared to each
other.
This study explored resource allocation and the relationship between the
categories of resources and student achievement. Drawing on a review of the literature, it
was hypothesized that, controlling for SES, student achievement would be positively
associated with higher spending on direct instruction and not related to resource
allocation directed to non-classroom use such as support staff, operations and specific
employee benefits.
Hypotheses 1 through 4 were tested by conducting analysis using panel data from
Rhode Island schools from 2005 through2008. Descriptive statistics were calculated for
all data. The intent was to test the association among school expenditure categories on
student performancewhile controlling for observed and unobserved confounders.
The models test the aggregated differences between the beginning and end of the
time period of the studyof the association between spending categories and achievement
at the school level. The assumption of independence is violated in Model 1as a result of
multiple observations of individual schools occurring over time. Since spending and
achievement are examined over a four yearperiod, clustered correlation exists. Correlated
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data are common in educational and social science research. Longitudinal and
hierarchically organized or clustered data represent two frequent analytical situations in
which data within clusters are correlated (Ghisletta, &Spini, 2004).
In order to ensure valid statistical inference when some underlying regression
model’s assumptions are violated it is common to rely on robust standard errors. The
most common of these alternative covariance matrix estimators was developed by Huber
(1967), and White (1980). Provided that the residuals are independently
distributed,standard errors which are obtained by aid of this estimator are consistent even
if the residuals are heteroscedastic. Figure 3.1 shows the independent distribution of the
standard residuals. This analysis utilized a robust estimator in the first linear regression in
Model 1.Multiple regression was utilized in Model 2, which tested the association
between the within-school change in per-pupil spending categories(direct instruction,
teacher support, therapeutic support, operations, leadership, and other expenses), and the
within-school change in student performance.
Table 3.1 lists the number of schools that meet the data requirements for the
analysis for the years 2005 through 2008 for both models.
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Table 3.1
Rhode Island Schools Participating in NECAPwithComplete Spending Data for the
Period
Year

Schools

2005

231

2006

232

2007

278

2008

261

The New England Common Assessment Program (NECAP) is the standardized
assessment instrument utilized by Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Vermont for the
time period under study (2005 through 2008). The NECAP is a series of reading, writing,
mathematics and science achievement tests, administered annually, and developed in
response to the Federal No Child Left Behind Act. The NECAP tests measure students’
accumulated academic knowledge and skills relative to grade expectations created by
teams of teachers representing the three states. Student scores are reported at four levels
of academic achievement: Proficient with Distinction (level 4) Proficient (level 3),
Partially Proficient (level 2) and Substantially Below Proficient (level 1). Reading and
math are assessed in grades 3 to 8 and 11, and writing is assessed in grades 5, 8 and 11
(Rhode Island Department of Education, 2010).
The dependent variable for all models (DV) is the percentage of students in a
given school who meet or exceed the standard (scores of level 3 and 4) on the (NECAP)
in reading, mathematics and writing.
The use of percentages as a dependent variable has limitations since it is an
aggregate of individual student performance and limited by its scale of 0 to 100. It was
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chosen since it is easily understood, is public information, and no comparable measure is
readily available as an indicator of school performance.
Data on spendingwere obtained from the Rhode Island Department of Education
(RIDE) In$ight program. District expenditures are divided into one of five broad
categories: Direct Instruction, Instructional Support, Operations, Other Commitments,
and Leadership. The five function areas are composed of the activities described in Table
3.2. The spending category definitions remained constant throughout the study period.
Therefore any changes over time in spending represent real changes in resource
allocations.
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Table 3.2
Spending Detail
Spending category
Direct classroom instruction

Description
Face-to-face classroom teaching
(instructional teachers only, not including
substitutes)

Instructional support

Student support: guidance services, library
and media, student health services and
extracurricular activities (therapeutic
support) Teacher support: curriculum
development, in-service and staff
development, and sabbaticals Program
support: management/administration,
therapists, psychologists, evaluators,
personal attendants, and social workers

Operations

Transportation, food service, safety,
building upkeep, utilities, maintenance, and
business services

Leadership

Building principal and administrative
office staff

Other commitments

Contingencies, special education tuitions,
capital projects, debt service, pass -through
accounts, retiree benefits and legal
obligations
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Each category is further separated into the location of the expenditure at the school level
(Rhode Island Department of Education, 2010).
The independent variables (IV) for Model 1 include: 1) spending on direct
instruction per-pupil, per-pupil expenditures allocated to classroom
instruction,andteacher salary/benefits; 2) teacher support per-pupil, per-pupil
expenditures allocated to support curriculum development, and in-service and staff
development; 3) therapeutic support per pupil and diagnostic and special education
services;4) operations per pupil, including per-pupil expenditures allocated to the cost of
utilities, maintenance, and maintenance staff salaries; 5) leadership per pupil, including
per-pupil expenditures allocated to the cost of the building principal and the school office
staff; 6)other expenses per pupil, including expenditures allocated to out-of-district
special education, post-retirement benefits for teachers (a proxy for union strength), and
legal expenses; and 7) percentage of students in each school who receive free and
reduced lunch(a proxy for poverty).
The independent variables (IV) for Model 2 include: 1) annual changes in
spending on direct instruction per pupil, including per-pupil expenditures allocated to
classroom instruction and teacher salary/benefits; 2) annual changes in spending on
teacher support, per pupil; 3) per-pupil expenditures allocated to therapeutic support; 4)
annual changes in spending on operations per pupil, including per-pupil expenditures
allocated to the cost of utilities, maintenance, and maintenance staff salaries; 5)annual
changes in spending on leadership per pupil, including the per-pupil cost of building
principal and the school office staff; 6) annual changes in spending on other expenses per
pupil, including expenditures allocated to post-retirement benefits for teachers (a proxy
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for union strength), and legal expenses;and 7) annual changes in the percentage of
students in each school who receive free and reduced lunch (a proxy for poverty).
Financial and student assessment data from 2005 through 2008 were used to test
the relationship between spending on direct instruction and student achievement in
reading, mathematics and writing. The dependent and independent variables for Model 1
are defined in Table 3.3, and for Model 2 in Table 3.4. The data were examined at the
school level.
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Table 3.3
Description of Model 1 Variables
Variable

Specification

Data source

Dependent variables
Student performance

Proportion of students who met or

RIDE

exceeded standard on the New

performance

England Common Assessment

data

Program in grades 3, 8, and 11 in
Reading, ELA and Math, 2005
through 2008
Independent variables
Year

Year of assessment

RIDE

Poverty index per school

% of students who receive free and

RIDE

reduced price lunch in a school
Direct classroom instruction

Per-pupil spending allocated to

per pupil

classroom instruction, including

RIDE In$ight

teacher salary/benefits
Teacher support per-pupil

Per-pupil expenditures allocated to

RIDE In$ight

curriculum development, in-service,
staff development and support

Therapeutic support perpupil

Per-pupil expenditures allocated to
professionals serving the needs of a
defined program (special education)
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RIDE In$ight

Variable
Other expenditures per-pupil

Specification
Per-pupil cost of contingencies,

Data source
RIDE In$ight

special education tuitions, capital
projects, debt service, pass-through
accounts, retiree benefits and legal
obligations
Operations per-pupil

Per-pupil expenditures allocated to the

RIDE In$ight

cost of maintenance, utilities, and
maintenance staff salaries

Leadership per-pupil

Per-pupil spending allocated to the
cost of building principal and the
school office staff
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RIDE In$ight

Table 3.4
Description of Model 2 Variables
Variable

Specification

Data source

Dependent variables
∆Student performance

Within-school change in the

RIDE

proportion of students who met or

performance data

exceeded standard on the New
England Common Assessment
Program in grades 3, 8 and 11 in
Reading, ELA and Math between
2005 and 2008
Independent variables
Year

Year of assessment

RIDE

∆Poverty index per school

Within-school change in the % of

RIDE

students who receive free and reduced
price lunch between 2005 and 2008

∆Direct classroom
instruction/pupil

Within-school change in per-pupil
spending allocated to classroom
instruction, including teacher
salary/benefits between 2005 and
2008
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RIDE In$ight

Variable
∆Teacher support/pupil

Specification
Within-school change in per-pupil

Data source
RIDE In$ight

spending allocated to curriculum
development, in-service, staff
development and support between
2005 and 2008
∆Therapeutic support/pupil

Within-school change in per-pupil

RIDE In$ight

spending allocated to professionals
serving the needs of a defined
program (special education) between
2005 and 2008
∆ Other expenditures/pupil

Within-school change in per-pupil

RIDE In$ight

spending allocated to contingencies,
special education tuitions, capital
projects, debt service, pass-through
accounts, retiree benefits and legal
obligations between 2005 and 2008
∆ Operations/pupil

Within-school change in per-pupil

RIDE In$ight

spending allocated to the cost of
maintenance, utilities, maintenance
staff salaries between 2005 and 2008
∆ Leadership/pupil

Within-school change in per-pupil
spending allocated to the cost of
building principal and the school
office staff between 2005 and 2008
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RIDE In$ight

Two separate model specifications were estimated to test the study hypotheses.
Model 1 tested Hypotheses one and two. Model 2 tested Hypotheses three and four.The
alternative specifications are two different analytic approaches to address and test the
same hypotheses. The first pooled performance and financial data cover the period 2005
through 2008 for reading, mathematics and writing. This model evaluates the crosssectional relationship between resource use and student achievement. All student
achievement and financial data will be modeled at the school level. The following model
was estimated for school i at time t:
Model 1 Equation
Performance it = b0 + b1 year t + b2 % students receiving free and reduced price lunch it
+ b3 per pupil spending on direct instruction it + b4 per pupil spending on
teacher support

it

+ b5 per pupil spending on therapeutic support it + b6per

pupil spending on operationsit + b7 spending per pupil on other expenses it
+ b8 per pupil spending on leadership+ e it

Performance is the percentage of students that met or exceeded the standard on
the New England Common Assessment Program. The model estimated separately for
reading, math, and writing performance. In this equation, Year is the variable for the year
of test administration (capturing trends in student achievement), % students receiving free
and reduced price lunch is a proxy for SES, spending variables (direct instruction,
teacher support, therapeutic support, operations, leadership, and other expenditures) are
the per-pupil cost of spending for given spending categories.
It was hypothesized that b3, the relationship between spending on direct
instruction and performance,would be statistically significant in a positive direction,
43

while the coefficients on the spending variables of pupil support, operations, leadership,
and other expenditures would be either non-significant or significant in a negative
direction.
While the first model tested the relationship between resource use and student
achievement, it omits a number of unmeasured variables that affect student performance.
These include teacher quality, parental support, individual student ability, and school
climate, all of which can contribute to school effectiveness but are not readily
measureable on a financial basis. To address the potential confounding from these
omitted factors, a second, longitudinal model was estimated. This model was based on
the assumption that the unmeasured factors omitted from the first specification are largely
constant within schools over time. Therefore, by subtracting variable values within
schools across adjacent periods, the unmeasured variables would be effectively canceled
out, decreasing confounding and allowing for better estimates of the association between
resource use and student achievement. The following model was estimated for school i,
in time twhere all variables are defined as before and ∆ indicates the change in a variable
between a given year and the previous year:
Model 2 Equation
∆Performance it = b0 + b1 year t + b2 ∆% students receiving free and reduced
price lunch it + b3 ∆ per pupil spending on direct instruction it + b4 ∆per pupil
spending on teacher support
it+

it

+ b5 ∆ per pupil spending on therapeutic support

b6 ∆ per pupil spending on operationsit + b7 ∆ spending per pupil on other

expenses it + b8 ∆ per pupil spending on leadershipit+eit
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This captures changes in performance due to outside factors. This model
controlled for a number of factors, including teacher quality, which may confound the
relationship between spending and achievement.
By accounting for unobserved confounders and by estimating the model in
changes, it was expected that b3, the association between the within-school change in perpupil spending on direct instruction and the within-school change in student performance
would be smaller than the association observed in Model 1. This is because of an
expected number of important unmeasured factors (e.g. teacher and administrator quality,
parental and community incentive to perform) to be positively correlated with both
spending on direct instruction and student performance. By estimating the model in
changes, these unmeasured factors would be accounted for, and by doing so it was
reasonable to expect a smaller effect of spending on direct student instruction on student
performance.
The second model examined the change of the variables. Should the model reveal
non-significant results, it would be difficult to conclude whether the factors were
insignificant or if the model lacked the power to detect them. For this reason the changes
were tested over the four year period.
All analyses used an alpha level of .05 to determine statistical significance.
Evaluation of Regression Assumptions
The assumptions of regression were tested through the examination of residuals.
First, the standardized residuals were examined for departures from normality. If
residuals are normally distributed, approximately 5% of the cases are expected to be
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beyond plus or minus two standard deviations. The prevalence of outliers was evaluated
by calculating the proportion of standardized residuals with values between 1.96 and 1.96. In Model 1, given the sample size of 1002, approximately 50 cases would be
expected to have standardized residual values that fall outside this range. Figure 3.1
shows the histogram of the standardized residual. Appendix Ashows the casewise
diagnostics. For the dependent variable reading, six standardized residuals have absolute
values greater than 1.96, for the dependent variable math, 14, and for writing, four. This
analysis indicates that fewer residuals are falling in the tails of the distribution than would
be expected by chance alone, suggesting that outliers are not having a substantial
influence on the results. Figure 3.2 also shows that the residuals for each of the dependent
variables in Model 2 are distributed approximately normal.
The homoscedasticity assumption was tested by evaluating the correlation of
residuals within schools across the four-year study period. To do this, an ANOVA was
performed (Table 3.6), where the standardized residual was the outcome and the school
indicator was the factor variable. This analysis found that the school factor was a
significant predictor of the residuals, indicating the clustering of errors within schools in
Model 1 (F= 5.42 (277, 695), p<.05).
Testing the homoscedasticity assumption was performed for Model 2 using the
Breusch-Pagan test. After differencing between years 4 and 1 of the panel, the Model 2
included only one observation from each school, making the Breusch-Pagan test
appropriate for the cross-sectional data (White, 1980). The Breusch-Pagan test rejected
the assumption of homoscedasticity for reading (the probability of constant variance was
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.03) and math (the probability of constant variance was .0042) but not for writing (the
probability of constant variance was .668).
The aggregate data in Model 1 meets all the assumptions except for the
assumption of homoscedasticity. Thus the assumption of independence is violated and
multiple regression cannot be utilized in Model 1. Instead, a generalized linear model is
estimated which calculates cluster-robust standard errors, based on the assumption that
errors are non-independent within schools, but independent across schools.
The assumption of independence is violated in Model 1as a result of multiple
observations of individual schools occurring over time. Since spending and achievement
are examined over a four-year period, clustered correlation exists. Correlated data are
common in educational and social science research. Longitudinal and hierarchically
organized or clustered data represent two frequent analytical situations in which data
within clusters are correlated (Ghisletta, &Spini, 2004).
In order to ensure valid statistical inference when some underlying regression
model’s assumptions are violated it is common to rely on “robust” standard errors. The
most common of these alternative covariance matrix estimators has been developed by
Huber (1967), and White (1980). Provided that the residuals are independently
distributed, standard errors that are obtained by aid of this estimator are consistent even if
the residuals are heteroscedastic. Figure 3.1 shows the independent distribution of the
standard residuals. This analysis utilized a robust estimator in the first linear regression
model.
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To address the violation to the homoscedasticity assumption in Model 1, a
generalized linear model was estimated which calculated cluster-robust standard errors,
based on the assumption that errors are non-independent within schools, but independent
across schools. In Model 2, a generalized linear model using heteroscedasticitiyconsistent standard errors (Huber 1980) was estimated to appropriately calculate standard
errors given the violation of the homoscedasticity assumption for two of the three
dependent variables.
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Table 3.5
ANOVA Standardized Residuals Outcome (School is the Factor)in Model 1
Sum of

df

Squares

Mean

F

Sig.

5.42

.000

Squares

Between Groups

659.83

277

2.38

Within Groups

305.16

695

.43

Total

965.00

972
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Figure 3.1
Histogram of Model 1 Variables
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Figure 3.2
Histogram of Model 2 Variables
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The central question in this study was whether there exists an association between
spending allocations and student achievement. The study was guided by two Research
Questions:
Research Question 1: What is the relationship between spending on public
education in Rhode Island and student achievement?
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between annual changes in
spending on public education in Rhode Island and annual changes in student
achievement?
These Research Questions were further focused by four Research Hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Higher per-pupil spending on direct instruction at the school level
is associated with higher student reading, math, and writing performance.
Hypothesis 2: Higher per-pupil spending on instructional support, operations,
leadership and other commitments at the school level are not associated with
higher student reading, math, and writing performance.
Hypothesis3: School-level changes in per-pupil spending on direct instruction are
associated with changes in student reading, math, and writing performance.
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Hypothesis 4: School-level changes in per-pupil spending on instructional
support, operations, leadership and other commitments are not associated with
changes in student reading, math, and writing performance.
This section first displays results from descriptive analysis of spending and
student achievement in Rhode Island from 2005-2008. It then shows the results from two
separate multivariate model specifications test the relationship between spending and
student achievement.
Descriptive Analysis
Table 4.1 shows the means and standard deviations of the percentage of students
who met or exceeded standard in reading, math, and writing on the NECAP assessment
and spending by expenditure category (instructional teachers, teacher support, student
therapeutic support, operations, other expenditures, leadership, and the proportion of
students receiving free and reduced price lunch. The sample size (n=1002) represents
data points for all the public schools in Rhode Island with complete data for the period.
Table 4.1 shows that the mean school-level rate of meeting the NECAP standard in
Rhode Island was approximately 65% for reading, 53% for math, and 51% for writing
between 2005 and 2008. Reading performance increased steadily throughout the study
period while math and writing scores remained relatively unchanged. Table 4.1 also
shows that the largest school expenditures were for instructional teaching ($7140 per
pupil in 2008), followed by spending on therapeutic support ($1201 per pupil in 2008),
operations ($1084 per pupil in 2008), other expenses ($885 per pupil in 2008), teacher
support ($770 per pupil in 2008), and leadership ($686 per pupil in 2008). The large
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standard deviations for instructional teaching, and particularly for therapeutic support,
indicate a great degree of variation in spending patterns across schools. Each spending
category increased over the study period while the proportion of students receiving free
and reduced priced lunch was stable.
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Table 4.1
Means and Standard Deviations for Variables in Model for Reading, Math and Writing,
2005 through 2008
Variable

2005

2006

2007

2008

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

61.50

18.61

65.08

17.58

65.56

17.51

68.98

15.76

53.03

19.13

56.32

18.25

50.71

22.64

53.87

22.31

54.24

17.62

48.78

20.45

48.40

19.64

53.03

19.17

6003

1490

6404

1903

6781

1630

7140

1696

586

288

643

310

743

361

770

375

889

1739

1148

1962

1106

2065

1201

1398

Operations per pupil

888

353

1005

712

1021

390

1084

494

Other expense per

808

490

854

531

868

497

885

515

603

293

659

338

690

360

686

265

34.69

30.32

35.07

30.31

33.67

27.42

33.44

26.49

Percent that met or
exceeded standard on
NECAP Reading
Percent that met or
exceeded standard on
NECAP Math
Percent that met or
exceeded standard on
NECAP Writing
Instructional teaching
per pupil
Teacher support per
pupil
Therapeutic support
per pupil

pupil
Leadership per pupil
Free and reduced
lunch
Sample size: 2005 n=231; 2006 n=232; 2007 n = 278; 2008 n=261
Sample sizes are reduced due to missing writing data for some schools
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Table 4.2 shows the means and standard deviations of the differences of
expenditure category (instructional teachers, teacher support, student therapeutic support,
operations, other expenditures, leadership, and the proportion of students receiving free
and reduced price lunch) between the base yearof 2005 and 2008, the last year of the
study period. The sample size (n=215) represents the differences between 2005 and 2008
of all the public schools in Rhode Island with complete data for the period. Table 4.2
shows that the mean difference in school-level rate of meeting the NECAP standard in
Rhode Island was approximately 8.31 % for reading, 7.28 % for math, and 2.19 % for
writing between 2005 and 2008. Table 4.2 also shows that the largest increase in school
expenditures was for instructional teaching ($1264 per pupil), followed by spending on
therapeutic support ($393 per pupil), operations ($193 per pupil), teacher support ($118
per pupil), other expenses ($95 per pupil), and leadership ($91 per pupil). The large
standard deviations for instructional teaching and the other spending categories,
particularly for therapeutic support, indicate a great degree of variation in spending
patterns across schools.
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Table 4.2
Means and Standard Deviations for Variables in Model 2 for the Differences in Reading,
Math and Writing between the Years 2005 and 2008
Variable

Mean

SD

8.31

7.58

7.28

9.22

2.19

13.68

$1264

$1329

$118

$172

$393

$759

Change in spending:Operations per pupil

$193

$368

Change in spending:Other expense per

$95

$292

Change in spending:Leadership per pupil

$91

$204

Change in spending:Free and reduced

-.86

9.43

Percent that met or exceeded standard on
NECAP Reading
Percent that met or exceeded standard on
NECAP Math
Percent that met or exceeded standard on
NECAP Reading Writing
Change in spending: Instruction/teaching
per pupil
Change in spending:Teachersupport per
pupil
Change in spending:Therapeutic support
per pupil

pupil

lunch
Sample size = 215

Model 1 Analysis
Model 1 pools school-level observations from 2005 through 2008 and usesa
generalized linear model to account for the non-independence of observationsto estimate
the relationship between the spending categories and achievement for reading, writing,
58

and math. In all models, the spending categories are in units of $1000 per pupil.
Therefore, model coefficient values are interpreted as the effect of increased per-pupil
spending by $1000 with the change in the proportion of schools that meet or exceed
standard on NECAP reading, mathematics and writing assessments.
Reading
Table 4.3 shows the summary of the Model 1 analysis for reading. The
relationship between the dependent variable (reading) and the independent variables
instructional teaching, therapeutic support, the percentage of students receiving free and
reduced price lunch, and the year is significant (F (10, 279) = 171.47, p < .05). The effect
size (R2= .76) shows that 76% of the variation in reading scores can be explained by the
model. There are 1002 total observations. The standard error is adjusted for 280 schools
over the four-year period.
Table 4.3 shows the associations between the dependent variable, reading and the
independent variables. Of the spending categories, instructional teaching is positively
associated with reading achievement. Based on the model, an expenditure of $1000
would increase the number of students in reading proficiency by 1.75 percentage points.
The therapeutic support is negatively associated with reading gains. The model predicts
that allocations decrease the percentage of students reaching proficiency by 2.16 for each
$1000 allocated to this expense.
The percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch is negatively
associated with reading performance. The model predicts that for each one percentage

59

point increase by students in this category, reading performance will decline .49
percentage points.
The testing year is also significantly and positively associated with reading scores
indicating an upward trend in reading performance that was unexplained by the other
model variables. These factors could be greater teacher emphasis on student performance,
increased test preparation and skill development, greater community awareness regarding
the importance of the assessments, and higher parental expectations.
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Table 4.3
Summary of Model 1 Regression Analysis for the Variables Associated with Reading
Achievement
2005-2008 (n = 1002, S.E. Adjusted for 280 Clusters by School)
Variable

B

SE B

1.75*

.41

-2.32

1.49

-2.16*

.26

-1.71

1.15

-2.77

1.61

-.95

.62

-.49*

.01

Year 2006

4.15*

.42

Year 2007

3.54*

.68

Year 2008

6.60*

.71

Spending on Instructional teachers per
pupil in thousands of dollars
Spending on Teacher support per pupilin
thousands of dollars
Spending on Therapeutic support per
pupilin thousands of dollars
Spending on Operations expense per
pupilin thousands of dollars
Spending on Leadership expense per
pupilin thousands of dollars
Spending on Other expenses per pupilin
thousands of dollars
Proportion of students receiving free and
reduced price lunch

R2 = .76
*p < .05
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Math
Table 4.4 shows the summary of the Model 1 analysis for math. The relationship
between the dependent variable (math) and the independent variables, including
instructional teaching, teacher support, therapeutic support, the percentage of students
receiving free and reduced price lunch and the first year of testing are significant (F (10,
279) = 84.95, p < .05). The effect size (R2 = .55) shows that 55% of the variation in
reading scores can be explained by the model. There are 1002 total observations. The
standard error is adjusted for 280 schools over the four-year period.
Table 4.4 shows the associations between the dependent variable, math and the
independent variables. Of the spending categories, instructional teaching is positively
associated with math achievement. Based on the model, an expenditure of $1000 would
increase the number of students achieving math proficiency by 3.03 percentage points.
Teacher and therapeutic support are negatively associated with math performance. The
model predicts that as allocations are increased, the percentage of students reaching
proficiency decreases by 14.99 percentage points for teacher support and 2.78 for
therapeutic support for each $1000 allocated.
The percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch is negatively
associated with math performance. The model predicts that for each one percentage point
increase by students in this category, math performance will decline .48 percentage
points.
The 2006 testing year is also significantly associated with math growth indicating
that factors not included in the analysis had an impact on student performance on the
NECAP. This could indicate the trend toward higher scores as teachers place more
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emphasis on student performance and increase test preparation and skill development.
However, scores dropped in 2007 and increased only slightly in 2008, although these
results were not significant. This one year rise may be indicative of better test preparation
that occurred in the second year of the period but leveled off in following years.
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Table 4.4
Summary of Model 1 Regression Analysis for the Variables Associated with Math
Achievement
2005 through 2008 (n = 1002, S.E. Adjusted for 280 Clusters by School)
Variable

B

SE B

3.03*

.72

-14.99*

3.02

-2.78*

.60

-3.06

1.75

-2.56

2.30

-.01

1.03

-.48*

.02

Year 2006

4.33*

.53

Year 2007

-1.58

1.08

Year 2008

1.22

1.29

Spending on Instructional teachers per
pupil in thousands of dollars
Spending on Teacher support per pupilin
thousands of dollars
Spending on Therapeutic support per pupil
in thousands of dollars
Spending on Operations expense per pupil
in thousands of dollars
Spending on Leadership expense per pupil
in thousands of dollarsin thousands of
dollars
Spending on Other expense per pupil in
thousands of dollars
Proportion of students receiving free and
reduced lunch

R2 = .56
*(p < .05)
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Writing
Table 4.5 shows the summary of the Model 1 analysis for writing. The
relationship between the dependent variable (writing) and the independent
variablesincluding:instructional teaching, teacher support, therapeutic support, the
percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch, and the first year of testing
are significant (F (10, 260) = 51.70, p < .05). The effect size (R2 = .46) shows that 46%
of the variation in reading scores can be explained by the model. There are 908 total
observations. The standard error is adjusted for 261 schools over the four-year period.
Table 4.5 shows the associations between the dependent variable, math, and the
independent variables. Of the spending categories, instructional teaching is positively
associated with writing achievement. Based on the model, $1000 in expenditures would
increase the number of students achieving math proficiency by 2.71 percentage points.
Teacher and therapeutic support for are negatively associated with writing performance.
The model predicts that allocations decrease the percentage of students reaching
proficiency by 11.25 percentage points for teacher support and 2.33 for therapeutic
support for each $1000 allocated.
The percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch is negatively
associated with writing performance. The model predicts that for each one percentage
point increase by students in this category, writing performance will decline .39
percentage points.
The first two testing years are also significantly and negatively associated
negative writing scores, indicating that factors not included in the analysis had an impact
on student performance on the NECAP.
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Table 4.5
Summary of Model 1 Regression Analysis for the Variables Associated with Writing
Achievement
2005-2008 (n = 908, S.E. Adjusted for 261 Clusters by School)

Variable

B

SE B

2.71*

.69

-11.25*

1.94

-2.33*

.41

-2.84

1.72

-4.94*

1.93

-.39

1.29

-.39*

.02

Year 2006

-4.45*

1.08

Year 2007

-5.64*

1.20

Year 2008

-1.36

1.24

Spending on instructional teachers per
pupil in thousands of dollars
Spending on teacher support per pupil
in thousands of dollars
Spending on therapeutic support per pupil
in thousands of dollars
Spending on operations expense per pupil
in thousands of dollars
Spending on leadership expense per pupil
in thousands of dollars
Spending on other expense per pupilin
thousands of dollars
Proportion of students receiving free and
reduced lunch

R2 = .46
*(p < .05)

66

Model 2 Summary
Reading
Table 4.6 shows the summary of the Model 2 analysis for changes in reading and
the independent variables instructional teaching, teacher support, therapeutic support, the
percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch between 2005 and 2008.
The percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch is significant (F (7,
216) = 8.39), p < .05).The effect size (R2 = .03) shows that 3% of the variation in the
change in reading scores can be explained by the model. There are 217 total observations.
The change in students receiving free and reduced priced lunch is the only
predictor of change in reading achievement. The percentage of students receiving free
and reduced price lunch is negatively associated with change in reading performance.
The model predicts that for each one percentage point increase by students in this
category, reading performance will decline .29 percentage points.
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Table 4.6
Model 2 Regression Analysis for the Variables Associated with Changes in Reading
Achievement (2008 values minus 2005 values)
(n = 217)
Variable

B

SE B

Change in instructional teachers per pupil

-.21

1.69

Change in teacher support per pupil

-4.91

11.26

Change in therapeutic support per pupil

2.18

1.16

Change in operations expense per pupil

2.76

6.35

Change in leadership expense per pupil

-.07

3.90

Change in other expense per pupil

-6.62

8.89

Change in the proportion of students

-.29*

.13

receiving free and reduced price lunch
R2 = .03
*(p < .05)
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Table 4.7 shows the summary of the Model 2 analysis for changes in math
performance. The relationship between the dependent variable (the difference in math
performance between year 4 and year 1) and the corresponding changes of the
independent variables instructional teaching, teacher support, therapeutic support, the
percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch and the first year of testing
are significant (F (5, 214) = 2.78), p < .05). The effect size (R2 = .03) shows that 3% of
the variation in the change in math scores can be explained by the model. There are 215
total observations.
None of the independent variables are associated with the differences in math
performance between year 4 (2008) and year 1 (2005).
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Table 4.7
Model 2 Regression Analysis for the Variables Associated with Changes in Math
Achievement (2008 values minus 2005 values)
(n = 215)
Variable

B

SE B

Change in instructional teachers per pupil

.06

.45

Change in teacher support per pupil

2.52

2.67

Change in therapeutic support per pupil

1.38

.81

Change in operations expense per pupil

2.06

6.15

Change in leadership expense per pupil

-1.69

3.23

Change in other expense per pupil

2.622

2.89

-.13

.07

Change in the proportion of students
receiving free and reduced price lunch
R2 = .03
*(p < .05)
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Writing
Table 4.8 shows the summary of the Model 2 analysis for changes in writing
performance. The relationship between the dependent variable (the difference in writing
performance between year 4 and year 1) and the corresponding changes of the
independent variables instructional teaching, teacher support, therapeutic support, the
percentage of students receiving free and reduced price lunch, and the first year of testing
are significant (F (5, 191) = 5.32), p < .05). The effect size (R2 = .02) shows that 2% of
the variation in the change in writing scores can be explained by the model. There are
192 total observations.
None of the independent variables are associated with the differences in writing
performance between year 4 (2008) and year 1 (2005).
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Table 4.8
Model 2 Regression Analysis for the Variables Associated with Changes in Writing
Achievement
(2008 values minus 2005 values)
(n = 192)

Variable

B

SE B

Change in instructional teachers per pupil

-1.05

.72

Change in teacher support per pupil

-.93

6.57

Change in therapeutic support per pupil

-2.70

3.92

Change in operations expense per pupil

2.26

3.35

Change in leadership expense per pupil

1.91

3.72

Change in other expense per pupil

2.62

4.56

Change in the proportion of students

.10

.20

receiving free and reduced price lunch
R2 = .02
*(p < .05)
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Summary
These results indicate that Hypothesis 1: Higher per-pupil spending on direct
instruction at the school level is associated with higher student reading, math, and writing
performance was supported by the positive associations determined by Model 1 analysis.
These results indicate that Hypothesis 2: Higher per-pupil spending on
instructional support, operations, leadership and other commitments at the school level
are not associated with higher student reading, math, and writing performance was
supported by the negative associations determined by Model 1 analysis.
These results indicate that Hypothesis 3: School-level changes in per-pupil
spending on direct instruction are associated with changes in student reading, math, and
writing performance was not supported due to the absence of statistically significant
associations as determined by Model 2 analysis.
These results indicate that Hypothesis 4: School-level changes in per-pupil
spending on instructional support, operations, leadership and other commitments are not
associated with changes in student reading, math, and writing performance was not
supported due to the absence of statistically significant associations as determined by
Model 2 analysis.
Limitations
There were a number of limitations to the study. In the case of the dependent
variable, the effects of schooling were not limited solely to test results, which at best,
represented a composite assessment of the knowledge and skills acquired by the student
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at a particular point in time. Standardized assessments are not the only measure of school
effectiveness. Schools have many goals, including social, developmental, and academic.
The use of percentages as a dependent variable has limitations since it is an
aggregate of individual student performance and limited by its scale of 0 to 100. It was
chosen because it is easily understood, was public information, and no comparable
measure was readily available as an indicator of school performance.
The In$ight spending data covered broad spending categories which does not
allow for more fine grained assessment of spending detail. For this reason, it was
abandoned by RIDE in favor of the Uniform Chart of Accounts (UCOA). School level
UCOA was not available until after 2008, the end period of the study. Nonetheless, the
In$ight data provides important information on school spending choices throughout the
study period which allowed for the assessment of how these broad patters of spending
were related to school achievement.
The results are limited to the school level and do not evaluate within-school
differences and the effect of spending on achievement. The results may not be
generalizable to other states.
Other limitations emerged specifically in Model 2. Model 1 pooled school data
from 2004-2008 but did not measure student characteristics or teacher quality and
interpretation of the model may be biased by unobserved confounders. Thus Model 2 was
needed. It assumed teacher quality and student characteristics were constant over the
study period and cancelled them out therefore allowing the model to analyze the effect of
resources on achievement. The model used multiple regression differencing methods but
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the results identified no statistically significant association between resource allocation
and student performance.
One limitation from Model 2 is that if unobserved characteristics were not
constant within schools over time, and that these characteristics were related to spending
categories, then the model would yield biased coefficient estimates. Future research that
better assessed school and student characteristics could potentially address this situation.
For instance teacher quality and other independent variables strongly associated with
student performance (Darling-Hammond & Sykes, 2003; Rivkin, Hanushek&Kain, 2005;
Wenglinsky, 2002)might have been included in the model to better estimate the
relationship between spending and achievement.RIDE data on teacher practice,
experience, and certification might have also identified a relationship between human
resource allocation and achievement.
Future research should therefore focus on identifying and measuring other
important school and student characteristics that could confound the relationship between
spending and achievement. This could result in a third model that explored the
association between resource allocation and teacher performance as determined by
evaluation results and a richer set of control variables.
Finally, other modeling techniques, making different assumptions about the
correlation of observations within schools, could have been employed in the study. To
address the clustering of observations within schools, Hierarchical Linear Modeling
(HLM) might have been utilized to estimate school-level parameters and variance
estimates.
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Strengths
Strengths of the analyses include the fact that the study:
1. Utilized a large sample size of pooled data over time
2. Included easily understood public data; and
3. Addressed the current RIDE agenda by linking the output-based Basic Education
Plan, the newly adopted funding formula, and the uniform chart of accounts
(UCOA)
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This study evaluated the relationship between school spending and achievement
in Rhode Island between 2005 and 2008. It was not unexpected to see differences in
achievement levels related to family income and community of residence. In this study,
student eligibility for free and reduced price lunch was used as a proxy for student
poverty. The mean percentage of this for the state is 35%, but in the urban communities,
the percentage is much higher. In Central Falls, 85.2% of the students qualify, followed
by Providence (78%), Pawtucket (64%), Woonsocket (63.9%) and Newport (51.3%). In
more affluent rural and suburban communities, the situation is reversed: 3.2% of
Barrington students qualify followed by East Greenwich (4.9%), Portsmouth (6.8%),
Scituate (7.0%), Little Compton (7.0%), and Jamestown (7.1%).
Schools in wealthy suburban communities such as Barrington and East
Greenwich,may see 90% of their students meet or exceed standard on reading
assessments, while in the poorer, urban cities of Providence and Central Falls, the success
rate may be in the 30% range. Math performance can even be worse, where in some
schools, less than 10% of the student population meets standard. The mean state
achievement levels in reading (65.20), math (53.09) and writing (51.02) may not be
surprising, but the variations in scores as evidenced by the standard deviations are a cause
for concern: reading (17.53), math (20.92) and writing (19.41) show a state where
between 82.73 and 47.67 of the students meet or exceed standard in reading, which
contains 68.2% (one standard deviation) of the students. In math, 68.2% of the students
fall between 74.01 and 32.17, and in writing, 70.43 and 31.61. These data indicates
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significant achievement gaps between districts in the state. These gaps are closely
associated with family income and the effects of poverty and confirmed by extensive
research (Coleman et. al., 1966, Reynolds & Walberg, 1992; Sirin, 2005;Wenglinsky,
1998).
In addition to the achievement gaps, are the wide variations in spending patterns
found across schools. In terms of total spending for the period of study, the state mean
was $12371 per pupil. Some small districts such as New Shorham (Block Island)
($24,083), Jamestown ($16744) and Little Compton ($16099) spend far more due to their
lack of economies of scale or high school tuition and transportation costs (Little Compton
and Jamestown have K – 8 programs and tuition their high school students to neighboring
communities). Yet there are major differences between more similar communities. For
the period of the study, Narragansett spent $14,947 per pupil, Gloucester $14,187, Foster,
$14,166 and South Kingston $14,058, while Cumberland spent $9,720, Barrington
$9,909 and Portsmouth $10,305.
Of the urban communities, Newport exceeds the state mean by spending $13,790
per pupil, Central Falls $13,463, and Providence $13,141. Woonsocket spends $2,301
below the state mean at $10,070 per pupil. Pawtucket also is below the state mean at
$11,630.
The study focused on how the total per-pupil spending was allocated. Results
from multiple regression indicated that spending on classroom instructional teaching
tended to be associated with higher reading, writing, and math achievement, as measured
by the NECAP exam. However, spending, on therapeutic support (primarily special
education services), teacher support, operations, and other expenditures (including post78

retirement benefits and out-of-district special education placements) were either
negatively associated with student achievement, or had no statistically significant
association. By using school-level data from all Rhode Island elementary, middle, and
high schools in the state, the study provides a comprehensive analysis of spending and
achievement over the period.
The relationship between spending and achievement varied across the two model
specifications that were estimated. In Model 1 pooled school-level observations were
shown across years of data from 2005 through 2008. However, Model 1 results did not
demonstrate whether this association was causal or related to how effective schools use
their resources. It implied that simply placing more resources in the form of higher
salaries and costly benefits for classroom teachers will not, in and of itself, improve
student performance. The aggregate model did not measure teacher quality. However, it
may be inferred that allocations to activities negatively or not associated with student
performance (teacher support, therapeutic support, operations and leadership) divert
resources away from classroom instruction, the one activity associated with student
achievement.
Model 2 evaluated whether the difference in spending on various categories
between years was associated with the difference in achievement between years. The
model did not find an association between spending and achievement. By holding
unobserved time-invariant factors (e.g. teacher quality) constant, this model was an
attempt to better identify the association relationship between spending and achievement.
It was anticipated that results from this model might highlight questions as to whether
any specific pattern of spending, by itself, could improve student
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achievement.Nonetheless, results from both models indicate that most forms of spending
are not positively associated with student achievement which highlights likely
inefficiency in spending across the state.
While the study was conducted at the school level, it is instructive to see the
differences of spending priorities that take place at the district level. Table 5.1 compared
the total per-pupil spending by districts with the amount allocated to instructional
teaching. Most of the districts in the state are at or near the state mean with 53% of their
per-pupil allocations dedicated to instructional teaching. Coventry (63.4%), Barrington
(60%) and North Smithfield (60%) dedicated the highest proportion, and Woonsocket is
the urban community with the highest ratio of 58.6%.
The only district of size which is considerably below the mean is Providence, at
45.4%. While allocating a low proportion to direct instruction, the district exceeds the
state average in spending for therapeutic support, operations, leadership and other
expenditures. Consequently, this study raises the question as to whether student
performance in Providence is being held back by poor resource allocation.
School budgets include statutory expenditures. By law and regulation, facilities
must be constructed and maintained, certification laws must be followed, and special
education services must be provided. The allocations to teacher support, therapeutic
support, operations and leadership are necessary, systemic expenditures, but must be
evaluated carefully in light of the model results. It is not known whether these allocations
are causal or the result of inefficient use, or influenced by other variables not included in
the model. For example, effective school leadership has been shown to positively impact
student achievement. It is unknown from the study results, however, whether ineffective
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leadership is counterbalancing effective practicesor if a disproportionate level of
spending is occurring for the function.
The cross sectional analysis in Model 1 shows a consistent relationship among
the spending categories, both positive and negative, and reading, math and writing
performance. The inconclusive results in the differencing Model 2 indicates that the
association may not hold over time. To the extent this study can inform, most forms of
spending do not appear to influence student performance. The one area that shows a
positive relationship is the allocation to direct classroom instruction.The results of this
study support earlier research that shows high performing district allocate a higher
percentage of their resources to classroom instruction than their lower performing
counterparts (Pan, Rudo, Schneider & Smith-Hansen, 2003).
Conversely, therapeutic support was negatively associated with reading, math and
writing, and teacher support was negatively associated with math and writing. The
negative association of therapeutic support may be attributed to selection bias. A large
portion of these expenditures is for special education services. The students who receive
special education are less likely to achieve proficiency due to the nature of their
individual education plans (Alexander, Boyer, Brownson, Jennings, & Patrick, 2000).
The negative association of teacher support is of more interest. The expenditures
for guidance, remedial staff and nurses, in theory, support students in order that they may
be better prepared to achieve at higher levels. For example, to address the problem of low
reading performance, the Rhode Island Board of Elementary and Secondary Education
enacted regulation requiring districts to hire certified reading teachers to oversee personal
reading plans (PLP) for underperforming students. Based on this study, it might have
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been more effective to conduct staff development for classroom teachers who are
positively associated with reading performance. Odden&Picus(2004) and
Wenglinski(2002) found that these forms of expenditures, along with school operations
and administration, were not associated with improved performance.
The study has implications for state-aid funding policy. The State of Rode Island
adopted a funding formula in 2010 after two decades of level funding with percentage
increases, regardless of enrollment, district performance, or budget allocation. The
formula is based on enrollment, the community’s ability to raise revenue for education,
and weighted student need accounting for family income. The formula attempts to
provide an equitable and adequate funding stream based on a “market-basket” of
expenditures (teacher salary and benefits, guidance, operations, leadership, etc.). The
formula does not dictate how resources are to be allocated.
The Uniform Chart of Accounts (UCOA) is a more detailed accounting than the
In$ight program utilized in this study. By publicizing student test scores, funding, and
UCOA data, RIDE makes the assumption that the public school committees and district
administrations will make comparisons between neighboring or comparable districts and
adjust resources accordingly.
The Rhode Island Basic Education Plan (BEP), developed in 1989, was based on
the principle that given an acceptable level of inputs, such as staff, access to standard
courses, libraries, textbooks, extra-curricular activities, students in the State would have
the same opportunity to learn. The new BEP, adopted in 2010, is outcome-based. It asks
whether students are meeting proficiency and graduating. Past disputes between a school
district and their funding authorities centered on the input data of the old BEP. A
82

municipality might be ordered by the Court for example, to provide additional funds to
offer French and Spanish as high school courses, or hire an additional librarian based on
student enrollment. Under the new BEP, monetary disputes are more complex. A district
must show that revenue is needed to improve student performance. This study will
provide additional information regarding the effect on achievement that specific
allocations have, and allow districts to prioritize their resources accordingly. Since there
is a positive association between resources allocated to direct classroom instruction and
student achievement, policy decisions that create funding streams diverted to other areas
may be counter-productive.
Future research on the relationship between funding and achievement might
consider more detailed examination of spending as independent variables as well as
student growth as the dependent variable. By focusing by the growth patterns of
individual student performance, better understanding could be gained as to how resources
can affect the nature of instruction.
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Table 5.1
Spending Allocation Means (expenditures per pupil)Rhode Island Districts, 2004-2008
District

Instructional

Teacher

Therapeutic

Operations

Other

Leadership

Teachers

Support

Support

($)

($)

($)

($)

($)

($)

(%)

State

6604

697

1041

1005

852

656

37.1

Barrington

5946

716

327

856

516

409

3.2

Burriville

6163

628

629

1013

693

567

25.5

Bristol-

6699

694

815

976

1155

717

22.9

Central Falls

7009

1043

1241

893

1194

667

85.2

Chariho

6663

630

787

966

1132

720

23.3

Coventry

6529

460

536

768

140

519

15.9

Cumberland

5381

625

951

836

600

431

17.9

E.Greenwich

6340

957

940

1221

387

861

4.9

E.Providence

6270

616

1191

835

1174

633

40.1

Exeter West

6929

969

744

883

867

819

10.6

Foster

7269

660

843

945

206

522

14.2

Gloucester

6993

526

1603

949

427

568

13.5

Jamestown

8003

682

809

992

4379

617

7.1

Johnston

7179

558

1232

782

1575

632

21.1

Lincoln

7147

727

583

1022

478

589

13.9

Little

7742

690

316

1267

3422

621

7.0

Middletown

7804

911

449

1312

995

616

16.2

Narragansett

8003

1362

1027

1255

546

959

9.6

Newport

7187

1302

1022

1074

1025

789

51.3

Expenditures

Free/Reduced
Lunch

Warren

Greenwich

Compton
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District

Instructional

Teacher

Therapeutic

Operations

Other

Leadership

Teachers

Support

Support

($)

($)

($)

($)

($)

($)

(%)

N. Shorham

15486

442

751

2576

0

2445

8.4

North

6011

784

1002

989

830

602

13.6

7396

848

1073

989

833

714

27.2

6040

611

623

703

640

475

Pawtucket

6169

600

1530

722

847

466

64.0

Portsmouth

5418

812

526

753

1148

571

6.8

Providence

5965

579

1053

1287

1091

676

78.0

Scituate

5820

622

532

901

428

588

7.0

Smithfield

6425

590

780

867

545

653

8.4

S. Kingston

7526

884

1375

987

961

755

11.3

Tiverton

6747

1026

410

718

1301

501

15.2

Cranston

6591

678

667

949

611

716

25.6

Warwick

7322

742

1359

1155

957

636

22.1

Westerly

7295

529

1329

951

612

602

26.7

W. Warwick

7021

792

1167

878

1071

694

37.1

Woonsocket

5902

600

551

839

714

435

63.9

Expenditures

Free/Reduced
Lunch

Kingstown
North
Providence
North
Smithfield
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Table 5.2
The Proportion of Direct Instructional to Total Per Pupil Spending in Rhode Island
Districts, 2004-2008.

District

Total Per Pupil

Direct Instruction

% of Direct

Spending

Spending

Instruction

Providence

13141

5965

45.4

Jamestown

16744

8003

47.8

Little Compton

16099

7742

48.1

Gloucester

14187

6993

49.3

Foster

14166

7269

51.3

Newport

13790

7187

52.1

Central Falls

13463

7009

52.2

North Kingstown

11473

6011

52.4

Portsmouth

10305

5418

52.6

Johnston

13622

7179

52.7

Pawtucket

11630

6169

53.0

Bristol-Warren

12572

6699

53.2

State

12371

6604

53.3

W. Warwick

13171

7021

53.3

Narragansett

14947

8003

53.5

South Kingston

14058

7526

53.5

Exeter West Greenwich

12891

6929

53.7

East Greenwich

11752

6340

53.9
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District

Total Per Pupil

Direct Instruction

% of Direct

Spending

Spending

Instruction

East Providence

11545

6270

54.3

Westerly

13326

7295

54.7

Chariho

12152

6663

54.8

Warwick

13357

7322

54.8

Scituate

10551

5820

55.1

Cumberland

9720

5381

55.3

Burriville

10882

6163

56.6

Smithfield

11170

6425

57.5

Cranston

11349

6591

58.1

Middletown

13359

7804

58.4

North Providence

12657

7396

58.4

Tiverton

11529

6747

58.5

Woonsocket

10070

5902

58.6

Lincoln

12048

7147

59.3

Barrington

9909

5946

60.0

North Smithfield

10050

6040

60.0

Coventry

10293

6529

63.4

N. Shorham

24083

15486

64.3
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APPENDIX A
Casewise Diagnostics
Dependent Variable: Reading Achievement

Case Number

Std. Residual

reading

Predicted Value

Residual

187

-5.083

22.22

67.0109

-44.78869

188

-3.408

38.46

68.4912

-30.02971

743

3.723

91.51

58.7011

32.80467

744

3.528

97.44

66.3553

31.08064

772

-3.069

38.24

65.2723

-27.03705

803

-4.098

19.75

55.8591

-36.10602

Dependent Variable: Math Achievement
Case Number

Std. Residual

math

Predicted Value

Residual

116

-3.173

16.04

49.7054

-33.66261

339

-3.011

16.92

48.8650

-31.94196

414

3.342

45.95

10.4938

35.45726

441

3.125

74.00

40.8446

33.15539

443

3.333

70.00

34.6445

35.35553

484

-3.371

19.52

55.2823

-35.76172

743

-3.332

40.23

75.5729

-35.34302

763

-4.185

3.45

47.8427

-44.39438

764

-3.954

4.35

46.2876

-41.93980

804

-3.217

9.38

43.4971

-34.12214

812

-3.533

10.29

47.7694

-37.47532

856

-3.593

30.24

68.3643

-38.12038

912

-3.450

23.81

60.4081

-36.59860

1163

-3.392

18.83

54.8186

-35.98455

writing
Predicted Value
.00
54.7639
41.00
2.7608

Residual
-54.76389
38.23923

Dependent Variable: Writing Achievement
Case Number
374
417

Std. Residual
-4.780
3.338

487

-4.288

23.26

72.3865

-49.13072

937

3.701

94.00

51.5933

42.40673
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